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R evealed as too heavy and slow in the 1999 conflict over Kosovo, the US Army currently faces a challenge to its
strategic relevance. Among Western militaries, however, it is far from alone in facing this unwelcome news. Most
notably the French experienced a similar realization in the aftermath of the Gulf War, where their influence was
marginalized by their unwieldy military organization. Consequently their audacious efforts since are filled with insights
for the US Army in the potentials and pitfalls of military reform.
The most relevant lesson is perhaps that if it had been left to its own devices, the French army would have pursued a
course of incremental change eerily similar to that which critics of current US efforts see today.[1] Their ultimate
decision to pursue a more radical course was imposed by politicians, for reasons only partly related to national
security. And yet because of the basic disinterest of the political classes in military affairs, the army was able to seize
control of the reform movement and direct it toward the army's own preferred ends. In so doing it has created a vision
of an inherently flexible force, one that provides political leaders with military options in the event of future crises.
And if the army, once known as the "Great Mute" for its political reticence, succeeds in implementing these plans, its
own influence and autonomy in government policymaking is bound to increase as well.
Strategic Contradictions: The Situation of the Early 1990s
In contrast to the geopolitical upheavals of the time, France in the early 1990s still retained the defense posture laid
down by President Charles de Gaulle 30 years before. Built around a principle of national strategic autonomy, these
policies served French interests in the Cold War when, as an associate of NATO remaining outside the unified military
structure, France enjoyed the security privileges of NATO membership without sacrificing any of its jealously guarded
sovereignty. The key to this strategic autonomy was the possession of an independent nuclear arsenal, the Force de
Frappe. Controlled by France alone, these weapons provided an assured national deterrent no matter what the views of
its American and European allies.
The central dilemma of French Cold War defense strategy concerned the credibility of this deterrent. Potential
aggressors needed to be convinced that there was a willingness to use these weapons. This quandary was neatly
resolved by the simultaneous possession of a conventional army of conscripted citizens that was prepared to honor
national defense commitments in the face of a Warsaw Pact attack. Armed with tactical nuclear weapons, the army's
engagement would signal France's determination to use whatever means required to defend its national interests.[2]
Confined to this secondary role in the nation's defense, an appreciative army found itself transformed into a symbol of
French patriotism. Blessed with plentiful low-cost conscripts, this powerful force embodied the nation's aspirations to
the rank of the world's "third military power."[3] Simultaneously as it united young men from all walks of life under
the colors, it took pride in being the "melting pot where the identity and spirit of the nation is forged, kept alive, and
reflected."[4] Still traumatized by the collapse in civil-military relations during the Algerian rebellion--which at
several moments threatened to become civil war--the institution greatly valued the presence of the conscripts, whom it
saw as a "sacred current of air," and a means to maintain its ties with the nation.[5]
Predictably, doubts about this strategy quickly surfaced after the 1989 collapse of the Berlin Wall. Obsessed by the
defense of the nation's eastern frontier since the 1870s, the army suddenly found itself without any enemies in that
direction. What justification was there for universal military service if there was no longer any threat to the nation? But

without a powerful army, how could France maintain its international stature next to the economic powerhouse of a
reunited Germany?
The outbreak of the Gulf War in 1990 forced these contradictions into the open. Barred from most operations outside
France since the early 1960s, conscripts could not be sent to the region without the approval of the National Assembly.
But faced with fierce public opposition to military action, French President François Mitterand saw little advantage to
a debate over the question.[6] Determined that France not remain on the sidelines, he decreed that only professional
troops would fight.
The result was the opposite of what he intended. Ostensibly already organized for war, the army scrambled to cobble
together an improvised all-professional force. Overnight some 5,000 professionals from throughout the army found
themselves transferred to fill out an expeditionary division of 15,000. For a military of some 250,000, this was not an
impressive contribution.[7] Once in Saudi Arabia, moreover, the French remained gallingly dependent upon the United
States for tactical intelligence and logistical support, and were ultimately relegated to a role of relative inconsequence.
Later, in the former Yugoslavia, French leaders were forced to relearn many of the same lessons. Unwilling to stand
aside in the face of a war in Europe, France maintained over 8,000 troops with the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) in Bosnia by 1995. And yet despite this impressive military commitment, and its determination to break
the diplomatic deadlock by force if necessary after the July 1995 fall of Srebrenica, France failed to persuade its allies
to follow its lead. Instead, lacking the capabilities to command a combined operation independent of NATO and the
United States, it found itself compelled to cede the leadership role to Brussels, and ultimately to Washington.[8]
Heedless of these problems faced by the army, French politicians in the early 1990s slashed defense budgets to cash in
on a perceived peace dividend.[9] The generous 1987-91 military programming law had projected equipment-related
"Title V" spending to grow by 11 percent in 1987, followed by six percent per year thereafter. In fact, under the
pressure of subsequent world events, the actual funds allocated under the annual finance laws fell far short of these
objectives. By 1989 the gap between the two stood at 7.58 percent.[10] Efforts to correct these spending plans with a
revised programming law only increased the shortfall to 10.19 percent by 1991.
Just as the French military confronted the need for major technological investments, the quantity of funds earmarked
for such purposes fell from the equivalent of $18.9 billion in 1990 to $17.4 billion in 1996 without accounting for the
effects of inflation. When measured as the cumulative annual differences between funds programmed in advance and
funds actually made available to spend, the total equaled a real loss of $5.6 billion, two thirds of which came from the
last two years.[11] The result was that long-awaited equipment upgrades were repeatedly delayed and scaled back over
the period. For instance, orders for the army's new Leclerc main battle tank decreased from 1,400 in 1986 to 406 a
decade later.[12] What all of this meant was that in the absence of a national strategy, defense policy was by default
left in the hands of the Finance Ministry.
The White Book: A Strategy for the Future
This stasis in French defense policy would be upset only by the approach of the post-Mitterand era. French presidents
have traditionally enjoyed enormous autonomy in foreign and defense policy, informally considered as their "reserved
domain."[13] But when forced into a "cohabitation" government with the right-wing Premier Edouard Balladur in
1993, an ailing Mitterand found these privileges challenged. With the upcoming presidential contest of 1995 in his
sights, Balladur asserted foreign and defense policies to be a "shared domain," and began a review of the main axes of
the national security strategy.[14] Completed in just three months, the grand strategic vision contained in the 1994
Defense White Book appeared just in time to establish Balladur as heavyweight strategic thinker before the onset of
the election campaign.[15]
The strategy this document set forth marked a radical change of direction for French defense planning. Gone was the
focus on a single major threat, and in its place was a world of threats, none of which appeared to greatly endanger
France. Left unresolved, the book warned, such minor problems could grow into real dangers that had no easy
solutions. The strategy set forth was therefore one of international activism, intended to manage crises and prevent
wars.

For the army this vision promised enormous change from the status quo of the previous 30 years. Henceforth it needed
to be ready to "confront scenarios that are much more varied than in the past, and often different from those for which
[the nation's defense assets] were hitherto conceived."[16] There would be no threat of a major war in Europe for at
least 30 years, the document predicted, adding that even if this proved false there would still be ten years of warning in
which to prepare. Instead it declared the future task of the military would be "the prevention and management of crises
of variable intensity" at great distance from national shores. In most of these cases, it continued, France would act
alongside partners.[17]
Thirty years of concern about national military autonomy had been swept away in the space of a few pages. Whereas
de Gaulle always saw French influence enlarged by its ability to act alone, the White Book concluded that henceforth it
was the ability to cooperate that mattered. In other words, a nation's influence rested on its capacity to command in
situations where "political, military, and regional dimensions mingle from the strategic point of view, while
multinational and inter-army [joint] dimensions mix in the military domain." To do this depended upon France's
"aptitude to master a few key functions, none of which were nuclear."[18] These included intelligence, strategic
mobility, command and control, and doctrine.
A new strategy meant a new army, able "to contribute, if necessary by force, to the prevention, limitation, or settlement
of regional crises or conflicts that do not involve risk of extreme escalation."[19] Because these were impossible to
foresee, and likely to occur simultaneously, the army must be ready to engage in a major regional contingency as part
of a coalition, and at the same time in one or more smaller interventions. "The organization of the forces must be such
as to make it possible to split them into elementary cells which may be reassembled on demand, into coherent groups
having all the capabilities of command, action, support, and assistance required for the intervention. The principle of
modularity will be the condition for the efficacy of the entire organization."[20]
Making Change Happen: The Politics of Military Reform
Armed with this guidance, and freed from political interference by the onset of the elections, the army began its own
assessment of force structure options.[21] Headed by General Jean-René Bachelet and entitled The Army of the
Twenty-First Century (ADT XXI), this study was an in-depth look at questions of doctrine, organization, equipment,
and budget. It was intended to provide the supporting data for the army's reform proposals, and two of its conclusions
stand out. First, it revealed that on the basis of cost alone, an all-professional force would be half the size of the mixed
professional-conscript alternative. Second, it showed that in light of the uncertain nature of future missions, the force
needed a completely refashioned command structure. Together these conclusions formed the rationale behind the
army's preference for a reorganized mixed model.
Jacques Chirac, elected President in 1995, agreed that it was high time for a change in the nation's defense
establishment. Dramatic gestures here, he thought, would nicely distinguish his government from that of the
disinterested Mitterand.[22] The means he announced on 22 February 1996 was an end to military
conscription.[23<P255M^J0> "Our borders are at peace, but the world close to us is not as yet," he declared the next
day to an audience of military officers. "France expects its armed forces [to] assure the protection of its vital interests
and the fulfillment of its international obligations."[24] Legally confined to France, and with only ten months of
military service, conscripts could not fulfill these functions. Charles Millon, the new Defense Minister, repeated the
intent to Le Monde several days later: "It is the right time to construct a more modern army, one that is stronger, and
better able to serve France, its interests, and global responsibilities."[25]
Chirac's decision to end conscription came as a complete surprise to all but the handful of officers who participated in
the secret deliberations of the defense reform working group called the Commaunité Stratégique.[26] Painfully aware
of the consequences of such a move, the army had consistently advocated a "mixed model" that blended conscripts
with professionals. This view, while not shared by the less-conscript-reliant air force or navy, was also that of Defense
Minister Millon. Conscription provided a cheap source of high-quality manpower--computer programmers and
linguists, for example, who might not otherwise be persuaded to serve. It was, moreover, the best means of
recruitment, as a full third of volunteers were conscripts who discovered they liked the army. "What will be the
motivation for the volunteers of tomorrow?" asked one military newsletter, if the army were to become "a job, a job
like all the others."[27] And finally, as old generals like to growl in the nation's newspapers, the end of conscription

opened the "way for the nation to disinterest itself with its own defense."[28]
In agreement with these views the Commaunité Stratégique's initial deliberations focused almost exclusively on the
mixed model. But the influence of these men, all of whom were senior military officers and defense policymakers,
paled beside those of the President's political confidantes, such as the former Minister of Defense and Foreign
Legionnaire Pierre Messmer, a longtime advocate of a professional force. Consequently, with half the allotted time
lost, the dismayed members suddenly discovered the President's predisposition and scrambled to put together a
credible model.[29] What saved them was the previous year's ADT XXI, which had ironically convinced the army to
fight for conscription. Armed with these cost figures, they submitted their final report on 15 February 1996. The
President's decision came one week later.[30]
A New Structure: The Army Seizes the Reins
Shocked by Chirac's decision, the army took eight months to tackle the problem. The manpower complexities boggled
the mind.[31] More expensive than a conscript force, an all-professional army called into question the force's entire
organization of personnel and equipment. Commanders struggled to define the number of cooks, drivers, and
maintenance technicians their units could afford. Every change also cascaded through the force's logistical and
administrative support systems. There were no easy answers, and time was needed to make sure the changes could be
managed once unleashed.
More important, these months gave the institution the chance to forge the internal consensus required to impose its
own vision of the future.[32] Little interested in technical details, the politicians left the army free rein to address the
important issues of force structure. Consequently the institution, which had languished on the margins of political
influence for 30 years, suddenly found itself invited to carve out a new and more important role for itself. In doing so,
army planners even dared to tinker with the President's guidance that the structure would be centered around four
specialized forces: armored, mechanized, armored rapid intervention, and assault infantry. Instead of rigidly defined
forces, the army leaders wanted "modularity," the ability to tailor forces to the needs of the moment.
The idea of modularity had been growing on French defense thinkers for at least 20 years. As early as 1975, a military
theorist and army officer, Guy Brossolet, had written a book suggesting that a modular force could resist a Warsaw
Pact attack better than the classical corps/division-based model.[33]
Never implemented as a Cold War defense strategy, his ideas contributed to the thinking behind the 1983 creation of
the Force d'Action Rapide (FAR).[34] Envisioned as an air-mobile reserve ready to counterattack Warsaw Pact forces
in depth, its mostly professional units also proved ideal for France's frequent overseas entanglements.
In this the FAR continued the army's long-held practice of tailoring forces for expeditionary operations, a tradition that
included the pre-1960s colonial army and subsequent African interventions.[35] But while such operations typically
involved few troops, the growing strength of modern African armies eventually forced France to adopt a less cavalier
attitude. The turning point was Operation Manta, launched in 1983 to defend Chad against a Libyan invasion.[36] Four
thousand soldiers deployed to the central African nation, armed with the latest in antitank and air defense capabilities.
Compelled by the lack of strategic airlift to go by sea to Cameroon, and then by land to Chad, the intervention force
required the participation of over 10,000 servicemen, from all three services, for 13 months. The ability to readily
conduct this kind of operation was exactly what army leaders wanted as they reviewed their options in 1996.
Convinced of the benefits of modularity, army planners developed two models for consideration.[37] The more
conventional choice (Figure 1, below) abolished the division structure and substituted a single Land Forces Command
(CFAT) to oversee 51 maneuver regiments organized in nine combined arms brigades. In addition to this the model
created four Force Commands (EMF), capable of receiving up to the equivalent of a division for a specific
contingency.

Figure 1. The new French army force structure.

The more radical alternative (Figure 2, below) retained the traditional division and brigade headquarters, but relegated
them to the role of stand-alone commands under the supervision of the Land Forces Command. Simultaneously this
model grouped all the army's regiments into a single pool under the direct supervision of the Land Forces Command,
which in time of need would combine them into tailor-made divisions or brigades for deployment to the operational
theater.

Figure 2. Proposed alternative French force structure.

Although the conventional model ultimately prevailed, the radical alternative elicited serious consideration. Army
leaders noted that it avoided the creation of expensive extraneous commands and allowed for future cuts of unwanted
regiments without disruption. Conversely, to cut a single regiment in the more conventional version would destroy the
operational coherency of its entire brigade. Nevertheless they deemed the changes required for the radical model as
being too extreme, whereas the transition from divisions to brigades was comparatively simple. Doubts focused on the
rapport between a regimental commander and his direct superior when the latter was a four-star general responsible for
an additional 50 regiments. Other questions concerned the ability of allies to understand and operate alongside French
forces organized in such a different manner. In the end, army leaders realized that if the force module concept worked,
and if additional changes were still necessary, it would be possible to move toward the more radical model.
Force Projection: What the Future Holds
Started in October 1996, this transformation will ultimately shrink the army from 239,000 to 136,000 by 2002.[38] The
total number of regiments will fall from 129 to only 85.[39] Simultaneously the total forces available for overseas
projection will rise from 12,000 to approximately 60,000. The "strategic contract" for their use requires that the army
be prepared to deploy either 50,000 non-rotating troops to a major contingency in the context of a European alliance,
or 30,000 partially rotating troops and associated logistical assets to a distant theater for a year. This latter scenario
also includes the capability to deploy 5,000 troops, rotating every four months, to a simultaneous contingency
elsewhere in the world.
Henceforth a strict separation between operational and administrative command responsibilities will be put in place at
all levels beneath the General Staff. For instance, the Land Forces Command's responsibilities encompass all
operational planning and command of forces, while the army's regional commands assume responsibility for routine
administrative matters.[40] In addition, the Land Forces Command will maintain the capability to provide the basic
structure of a joint theater headquarters, a combined NATO army corps headquarters, or a French army corps
headquarters.
Alongside the Land Forces Command, the army created a Ground Logistic Forces Command (CFLT) to direct two
logistics brigades. There was some consternation at the separation of these two commands, which some saw as an

artificial constraint devised to keep them subservient to the army General Staff.[41] Others, however, saw the division
as justified by the need to divorce the purely operationally focused Land Forces Command from the distraction of the
logistics command's daily support responsibilities.[42]
In place of the division will be the four Force Commands. Each led by a major general, these standing operational
headquarters will provide the command and control capabilities for rapid force deployment. Their mission is to provide
the nucleus of a joint headquarters for a task-organized force of 5,000 French troops, or that of a combined division
headquarters for a NATO force of 12,000 to 18,000.[43] In classic conventional warfare, however, the commander of a
Force Command is not intended to simply replicate the former operational and tactical roles of the division
commander. Instead he is to maintain a strategic vision of events, while the combined-arms brigade commander fights
the battle.
Nine combined-arms brigades (two armored, two mechanized, two light armored, one airborne, one mountain infantry,
and one helicopter brigade) are being created. Their mission is to "conduct combined-arms combat, bringing to bear
all the operational functions necessary to carry the decision, through the employment of a combination of fire and
maneuver."[44] But while the combined-arms brigades allow France to retain the capacity to contemplate conventional
combat operations, they will not be the basic unit in future force deployments. This role instead goes to the regiment.
Fifty-one maneuver regiments, supported by 15 logistics regiments and 19 specialized support regiments, will provide
the basic modular elements for task force composition.
Doctrinal Evolution: The Mastery of Violence
Aware that modern political leaders want their soldiers to stop or prevent wars, rather than fight them, the French army
realized that to succeed in its new role it also needed to rethink its views on how to use force. All too often it seemed
that conventional armies found themselves ill-suited to the situations they confronted, with neither enemies nor exit
strategies being clearly defined. Army leaders concluded that it requires a different operational approach to "restore
order" than is needed to win a classical military victory. To address this question, and to correct what was seen as an
inability to operate without an opponent, the army has defined two operational modes in its concept of
employment:[45]

. The Mastery of Violence: To prevent, contain, and strictly control the escalation of violence in a manner that includes
from the very beginning of the operation a totality of political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and media actions.

. Coercion by Means of Force: To impose the national or international will by the engagement, in a reversible manner,
of forces best suited to compel the designated adversary to renounce his objectives.
While the second mode represents a more traditional use of military force, the first represents a new departure in
French doctrinal thought. It is not a peacekeeping doctrine. In fact, its author, former armor officer and army maverick
General Loup Francart, wrote it in part as a reaction to efforts to strictly differentiate between combat and
peacekeeping. It is an attempt to think through the ways that force can be used in violent situations where there are no
declared enemies.[46] Approved in November 1997 by the Army Chief of Staff, General Mercier, it is contained in the
current draft joint doctrine for the employment of operational forces and is scheduled to become official army policy in
2006.[47]
The heart of Francart's analyses is that violence itself, rather than an identifiable opponent, will likely be the primary
future enemy of French and allied soldiers. Consequently, operations must first be analyzed so that commanders can
"penetrate the rationality or the irrationality of the various parties," which while not being considered as real enemies,
"cannot be regarded as neutral elements."[48] He or she must distinguish between a variety of dynamics, ranging from
actual hostility to generalized unrest, to determine the nature and degree of force required to "control, dominate, and
eliminate" the threat. Since the aim of military action is to achieve exactly this end-state, it must be employed in a
manner to "remove from the belligerents both their physical and moral freedom of action" without provoking an
escalation in their opposition.[49] This requires that a commander understand an environment's operational dimensions
(land, sea, air, human, electromagnetic), and networks (human and physical), and be able to assert control over them.

A New Army: Major Axes of Cultural Change
Together these changes in strategy, organization, and doctrine add up to a new army. Symbolic of these reforms is the
new willingness--and even enthusiasm--to participate in combined operations. This attitude stems from both the Gulf
War and the interventions in the former Yugoslavia, where France's limited military capabilities marginalized its
influence in the diplomatic arena and compelled its forces to operate under de factoAmerican command.[50] "To enter
onto the staffs of NATO," wrote one well-known colonel about the lessons of Bosnia, "is to assure our continued
power to affect events."[51] The army agrees, as it makes clear in its second Conduct of the Transition Order: "France
can not stay outside of international affairs. . . . The army must therefore participate in the actions brought by the
country to maintain its role and rank in the world; in respect to its engagements with international organizations, the
priority will remain the maintenance of interoperability with the armies of Europe and NATO."[52] This meant, the
order continued, a massive effort to promote knowledge of English, the adoption of command structures similar to
those of the alliance, and the placement of officers on the staffs of combined joint task forces "whenever the
opportunity presented itself."[53]
Of course this transformation has not been entirely to the army's liking. The President imposed the end of conscription,
despite the army's opposition. The consequences of this change frighten traditionalists, who fear that the citizen's army
has been replaced by a force that seems dangerously "utilitarian," and free from democratic control.[54] A telling
example of the potential for misuse can be seen in the 1994 Operation Turquoise in Rwanda. Ostensibly deployed to
stop the genocidal violence sweeping the country, recent revelations about political and economic ties between
President Mitterand and Hutu extremists have prompted accusations that the real French objective was to protect those
responsible for the massacres. "Essentially," one general bitterly recalled for Le Figaro, "we were just obedient
Hussars."[55]
But concerns that the army will become a modern version of the Teutonic Knights are probably misplaced.[56] It is
more likely that the course of change adopted will result in a more influential role for the service than has been the
case for 30 years. "Armies will be more and more judged on the `services rendered,' which means that militaries will be
give numerous missions, other than war," predicts the same colonel quoted above, in light of his experiences in
Bosnia. Just as has occurred in Washington, French politicians will turn to their soldiers when faced with the crises of
the future, whether or not these amount to war in the classic sense. This "militarization" of foreign policy must
inevitably raise the visibility of the army in Paris, as well as in the operational theater. That this is the case is due to
the confused nature of recent military engagements. "In [today's] theatre of operations the previous radical distinction
of [political and military] roles is no longer acceptable," writes the colonel. "War is no longer the opposite of peace; it
is a mixture of phenomena, from which the political and the military cannot be distinguished."[57] In other words, to
be effective, French soldiers must become politicians.
More worrisome for the army is the danger that political leaders won't spend the funds needed for an effective forceprojection capability. In fact the important annual Title V allocations slipped from $17.4 billion in 1996 to $13.3
billion in 1999 under the pressure of reform-related expenses.[58] This was exacerbated by a sudden unanticipated
increase in funds required for external operations, which rose from around $340 million in 1998 to more than $800
million in 1999.[59] And while the funds have increased in the 2000 budget to 85 billion Francs, that is still less than
the 86 billion Francs (or $17 billion in 1995 currency) promised in the 1997-2002 Military Programming Law.[60]
If the funds are found, and if luck is on their side in future budget battles, then credit goes to the army, which through
foresight and planning largely succeeded in wresting control of the reforms thrust upon them by the nation's political
leaders. These changes did not come easily. There remain elements in both France and its army that are disquieted by
this future. It is certain that without the combined pressure of budget decreases and the sudden end to conscription,
any reforms would have been incremental, if undertaken at all. But once the inevitability of radical change became
clear, it was the army rather than the politicians which determined the direction the change took. In doing so, the army
staked out a new role for itself, one that is potentially both more influential and autonomous than that which it has long
held. In other words, the French army of tomorrow will be, on the whole, the creation of its soldiers rather than of its
politicians.
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